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Chronopinの業界予測:ライブ系列、調査スナップショット、ゴールドマン・サックス、ガートナー、IMF、IEAなど発表元の引用付き予測を、出典と引用文とともに掲載します。
Ramp counts businesses with a card or invoice payment for AI; the Census BTOS lines (fortnightly, all employer firms) ask whether the business used AI in the last two weeks and expects to in the next six months.
Goldman Sachs Research's extrapolation of its preferred estimates; it notes consensus 2027 capex projections are likely too conservative.
“Those estimates imply that AI capex will rise from 1.8% of GDP in the US (with global AI investment totaling 0.9% of global GDP) in 2026 to 2.5% of GDP in the US (1.3% globally) in 2027, with a further increase to 2.8% (1.4% globally) in 2028.”
予測は引用元の発表によるもので、ChronoPin のものではありません。
確認日 2026-10-26
AI-optimized IaaS, servers, network fabric, AI processing semiconductors and devices; the largest segment of Gartner's AI spending forecast.
“AI Infrastructure 981,920 1,484,397 1,977,685 (millions of U.S. dollars, 2025, 2026, 2027)”
“AI Infrastructure 975,581 1,431,509 1,890,310 (millions of U.S. dollars, 2025, 2026, 2027)”
予測は引用元の発表によるもので、ChronoPin のものではありません。
確認日 2026-10-26
Gartner's September 2026 forecast, its third of the year: January and May editions (grey dotted) were both revised up. The 2025 value is Gartner's estimate.
“Total AI Spending 1,786,671 2,670,460 3,637,292 (millions of U.S. dollars, 2025, 2026, 2027)”
“global AI spending will hit $2.53 trillion in 2026 and reach a staggering $3.33 trillion in 2027.”
“Total AI Spending 1,764,947 2,595,667 3,493,358 (millions of U.S. dollars, 2025, 2026, 2027)”
予測は引用元の発表によるもので、ChronoPin のものではありません。
確認日 2026-10-26
Tokens consumed per week, in trillions, by model maker. Weekly (Monday to Sunday) totals for businesses on Ramp's card and bill-pay platform, from Ramp AI Token Spend Management; a sample of Ramp customers, not the whole US. Lines are refreshed by the 6am and 6pm job.
“Total token spending rose 23.0% compared with the same week last month.”
確認日 2026-10-26
Dollars spent on tokens per week, in millions, by model maker. Weekly (Monday to Sunday) totals for businesses on Ramp's card and bill-pay platform, from Ramp AI Token Spend Management; a sample of Ramp customers, not the whole US. Lines are refreshed by the 6am and 6pm job.
“Total token spending rose 23.0% compared with the same week last month.”
確認日 2026-10-26
Blended price per million tokens (token spend divided by token volume, all token types) for OpenAI and Anthropic, as Ramp charts it; weekly seven-day totals. Measured on businesses on Ramp's card and bill-pay platform, from Ramp AI Token Spend Management; a sample of Ramp customers, not the whole US. Lines are refreshed by the 6am and 6pm job.
“Total token spending rose 23.0% compared with the same week last month.”
確認日 2026-10-26
予測を一目で · 9
Investment (capex and related spending), not only software or subscription spend.
“That projection points to $1 trillion of AI-related investment around the globe in 2026, including $581 billion in the US”
Both figures are floors ("more than"), across each company's own fiscal year; FactSet's FY28 estimate is more than $900bn. Not a US-only total.
“Aggregate cash capex of five hyperscalers is expected to exceed $690bn across their respective FY26 periods”
An August 2024 forecast (software, hardware and services; GenAI is $108B of it). Later Gartner and Goldman Sachs estimates are far higher.
“AI spending in the United States will reach $336 billion in 2028, making it the largest geographic region for AI investment”
International Federation of Robotics forecast of annual industrial robot installations; 2025 installations were above 600,000 units, up 11%.
“Installations are forecast to rise by 9% to 655,000 units in 2026 and reach 806,000 units in 2029.”
Total addressable market; shipments of 1.4 million units over the same period. A 2024 estimate, not yet refreshed.
“The total addressable market for humanoid robots is projected to reach $38 billion by 2035, up more than sixfold from a previous projection of $6 billion”
USD trillions. WSTS calculates $1,655 billion for 2026 and approximately $2.1 trillion for 2027 after replacing Q2 estimates with actuals. WSTS explicitly says these are calculations using the original Spring growth assumptions, not a new forecast scenario.
“The calculation for 2027 reaches approximately 2.1 trillion US dollars”
USD billions. February 2026 published forecast abstract; this supersedes the $240 billion 2026 figure in the July 2025 release. Full research is subscription-only.
“Spending on information security is expected to grow to $244 billion in 2026”
USD trillions across the IT market. This aggregate includes infrastructure, software and services; it is not a separate market-size estimate for each matching category.
“Worldwide IT spending is expected to reach $7.35 trillion in 2027, up 15% from 2026”
USD billions of worldwide quantum-computing company revenue. $4.4 billion is the published upper estimate (“as much as”), not a midpoint, guaranteed outcome or economic value enabled by quantum computing. The separate $60–100 billion 2035 internal quantum market has a broader scope and is not substituted here.
“that could grow to as much as $4.4 billion by 2028”
Share of US businesses on Ramp with a payment for an AI product or service in the month.
確認日 2026-10-26
Share of US businesses on Ramp with a payment for an AI product or service in the month.
確認日 2026-10-26
Share of US businesses on Ramp with a payment for an AI product or service in the month.
確認日 2026-10-26
Share of US businesses on Ramp with a payment for an AI product or service in the month.
確認日 2026-10-26
Share of US businesses on Ramp with a payment for an AI product or service in the month.
予測を一目で · 5
Stanford HAI reports employment in AI-exposed jobs down more than 4% this year, and for workers aged 22 to 25 in software development and customer service, employment down over 3% a year since ChatGPT's release, recently 4.4% (ADP payroll data; the authors call some findings preliminary).
Annual real GDP growth, not nominal market size. October 2026 baseline; geopolitical, trade and financial risks can change the outlook.
“global growth to slow to 3.1 percent in 2026 and rebound to 3.4 percent in 2027.”
Annual volume growth in goods trade, not trade value or commercial services. The same October update forecasts 4.1% in 2027; shipping disruption and energy costs remain risks.
“merchandise trade volume is now expected to grow by 3.9% in 2026”
Annual global passenger traffic growth measured in revenue passenger kilometres (RPK), not passenger headcount. June 2026 outlook reflects fuel costs and airspace disruption; it is not a tourism-arrivals forecast.
“Passenger traffic is now forecast to grow by 2.1% in 2026”
USD trillions of stablecoin issuance in Citi’s September 2025 base case. Not annual payment volume, all crypto assets or a token price target. The bull case is $4 trillion; Citi’s Q1 2026 summary still cites the $1.9 trillion projection. Other banks’ estimates are separate forecasts.
“$1.9 trillion base case (previously $1.6 trillion) and $4.0 trillion bull case ($3.7 trillion)”
予測を一目で · 6
Approximately 50% of electricity generation, not all energy consumption. Includes nuclear and renewables; an outlook rather than a measured 2030 result.
“Renewables and nuclear are together expected to account for around half of global electricity generation by 2030.”
Millions of battery electric and plug-in hybrid cars sold worldwide. The IEA outlook is sensitive to affordability, policy and energy prices; this is not a forecast of all vehicle sales.
“Global electric car sales are expected to grow to 23 million in 2026, representing 28% of total car sales.”
Approximate increase in annual copper demand to 2040 in the IEA outlook, not total demand or cumulative consumption. The outlook describes the Stated Policies Scenario; policy and technology choices affect the outcome.
“copper records the largest volume growth, adding about 7 million tonnes to 2040”
75% is the probability for the entire five-year average, shown at the end of the forecast window; it is not a temperature or an annual series. Temporary five-year exceedance is distinct from the Paris Agreement long-term warming threshold.
“It is likely (75% chance) that the 2026-2030 five-year mean will exceed 1.5°C above the 1850-1900 average.”
Billions of tonnes of annual cereal production, under the baseline outlook. Weather, energy and fertilizer shocks can change the projection. This is not seafood production.
“Global cereal (grain) production is projected to increase steadily, reaching a record 3.22 billion tonnes by 2035.”
Approximate global annual disaster count if the trajectory used in the 2022 assessment continues, not a prediction of where or when an individual disaster will occur. This is an older conditional projection, restated in a November 2025 UNDP article; it is not a new 2026 model run.
“If we continue this trajectory, by 2030, the world will face some 560 disasters per year”
予測を一目で · 9
USD billions across PC, console and mobile games; excludes a separate forecast for tabletop games. Published forecast, not realized annual revenue.
“The global games market is forecast to generate $213.9 billion in 2026, an increase of 6.1% year over year.”
USD trillions across 12 entertainment and media sectors in 53 countries and territories, including film, TV, publishing, music and business events. This is the whole industry total, not the revenue of an individual category. Publisher-issued release.
“The global entertainment and media (E&M) industry will hit US$4.2 trillion in revenues in 2030”
USD billions. Covers anime distribution, merchandising and other licensed activity, not only studio production revenue. Commercial publisher estimate from its public summary; the underlying research is paid. Rounded figures follow the summary text, not the more precise chart.
“projected to grow from USD 41.7 billion in 2026 to USD 77.2 billion by 2033”
USD billions, covering printed and digital manga. A commercial publisher estimate rather than audited sales; underlying research is paid. Not additive to overlapping comic-book market estimates.
“projected to grow from USD 11.9 billion in 2026 to USD 43.9 billion by 2033”
USD billions. The publisher includes manga among comic-book genres, so this must not be added to the separate manga forecast. Rounded summary values are used consistently. Fortune Business Insights publishes a different 2034 estimate under a separate methodology; estimates are not blended.
“projected to grow from USD 20.5 billion in 2026 to USD 37.2 billion by 2033”
USD billions. Broad physical games and puzzles scope, including board/tabletop games and puzzles; not a board-games-only, trading-card-only or video-game forecast. Commercial estimate from the public summary; underlying methodology is paid and scope differs across publishers.
“projected to grow from USD 26.3 billion in 2026 to USD 104.0 billion by 2033”
USD trillions, including sports-related broadcasting, streaming, nutrition, wearables and tourism. Not just league revenue. A growth trajectory exposed to physical inactivity and environmental risks; the report also discusses downside losses.
“growing to $3.7 trillion by 2030 (a 10% compound annual growth rate) and reaching $8.8 trillion by 2050”
Annual growth in the number of jewellery items sold over 2025–2028, shown at the end of the interval. Not annual revenue growth, total cumulative growth or a forecast for all clothing. The report’s headline fashion outlook is only qualitative (low single digits).
“Between 2025 and 2028, jewellery is projected to record annual unit growth of 4.1 percent”
Survey outlook for 2026: 43% of dealers expected sales to improve, 38% expected stable sales and 19% expected a decline. These are respondent shares, not predicted sales growth or a 43% probability that the market grows. Kept as a cited note rather than a numerical market forecast. The report’s $59.6 billion figure is realized 2025 sales, not a forecast.
“43% of dealers expected sales to improve”
Share of US businesses on Ramp with a payment for an AI product or service in the month.
予測を一目で · 6
Millions of additional teachers needed, including replacements for departing teachers; a planning requirement, not predicted hiring. The 2026 scope includes pre-primary education, so it is not directly comparable with the older 44-million primary/secondary estimate.
“it needs another 50 million teachers by 2030 to ensure universal access to pre-primary, primary and secondary education”
Count of NATO allies expected in the July update to spend at least 3.5% of GDP on core defence during 2026. Not 5% of GDP or five countries already verified by final accounts. The broader 2035 commitment is a policy target, not treated as a forecast here.
“In 2026, five Allies are already expected to meet the 3.5% guideline for core defence requirements”
USD billions. Commercial revenue forecast covering corporate, litigation, taxation and other legal services. Not the size of public justice budgets, a prediction of court outcomes or prison population. Public summary only; underlying research is paid.
“projected to grow from USD 1,158.2 billion in 2026 to USD 1,375.6 billion by 2030”
Approximately 25% lower global intentional-homicide rate in 2030 relative to 2015 if current trends continue; a cumulative rate reduction, not a 25% annual decline, all-crime forecast or number of deaths. The source’s “one quarter” is represented as 25%. Regional trajectories vary; the target is not treated as achieved.
“the global homicide rate in 2030 will be around one quarter lower than in 2015”
A conditional demographic scenario, explicitly not a prediction: religious switching and other assumptions remain at the rates used in Pew’s 2020 baseline. Includes children; not worldwide religious composition. This is a 2022 scenario, not a refreshed 2026 forecast. Pew’s February 2025 observations found that the US Christian decline had slowed or may have leveled off, so the old scenario should not be read as inevitable.
“In 2070, 46% of Americans would identify as Christian”
Dated model snapshot observed October 25, 2026; publisher displays “Last updated Oct 25, 4:57 PM” without a timezone in the page text. Outcome date is the November 3 election, not market settlement. This is a probability, not a vote share, realized result or live feed; refresh before using it after the observation day and resolve after the election.
“Decision Desk HQ's model gives Democrats a 79% chance of winning the House”
NASA’s October 2026 forecast of the dimensionless 13-month-smoothed sunspot number, November 2026–October 2027. Dates mark monthly buckets, not exact-day predictions. Values use the sunspot 50th-percentile column, not the geomagnetic Ap columns; published 5th/95th percentile uncertainty is omitted from the line. Not a local aurora forecast.
“2027.0003 JAN 98.2 72.9 54.5 21.4 15.5 11.6”
予測は引用元の発表によるもので、ChronoPin のものではありません。
確認日 2026-10-26
予測を一目で · 1
USD trillions, a 2024 long-term projection. Includes space-enabled activity as well as the core space industry; not launch-service revenue alone. No newer comparable edition was verified in this research.
“The global space economy will be worth $1.8 trillion by 2035”